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DOES TECHNOLOGY REQUIRE NEW LAW? 
• 
DAVID FRIEDMAN 
Technological change affects the law in at least three ways: 
(1) by alteririg the cost of violating and enforcing existing legal 
rules; (2) by altering the underlying facts that justify legal rules; 
and (3) by changing the underlying facts implicitly assumed by 
the law, making existing legal concepts and categories obsolete, 
even meaningless. The legal system can choose to ignore such 
changes. Alternatively, it may selectively alter its rules 
legislatively or via judicial interpretation. In this essay I first 
discuss, as an interesting historical example, past technological 
changes relevant to copyright law and the law's response. I 
then go on to describe the technological changes that are now 
occurring or can be expected to occur over the next few 
decades, the issues they raise for the legal system, and some 
possible responses. I conclude with a brief discussion of the 
degree to which such changes can be addressed under current 
legal rules and the degree to which new rules may be required. 
I. COPYRIGHT: THE TECHNOLOGIES 
Prior to the copyright act of 1891, works by British authors 
were unprotected in the United States. Despite the lack of 
protection, British authors sometimes made more money from 
sales in the United States than from sales in Britain. The reason 
appears to have been that the printing technology of the time, 
hand set lead type, provided a substantial first-mover 
advantage. 1 The authorized publisher, having paid his fixed 
costs from sales during the period after the book had come out 
* Professor of Law, Santa Gara University. This essay is a revised version of 
remarks delivered at the Federalist Society Twentieth Annual Student Symposium 
on "ls Technology Changing the Law?" at Boalt Hall School of Law, March 9-10, 
2001. 
1. "In fact, lead time was important enough that many English writers earned 
more from the sale of advance proofs to American publishers (despite lack of 
copyright protection in America) than from the copyright royalties on their 
English sales." Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright 
in Books. Photocopies. and Computer Programs, 84 HARv. 1. REv. 281, 300 (1970). 
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but before a pirate copy could be set and printed, could, if 
necessary, issue a lower priced "fighting edition" designed to 
prevent the pirate from recovering his fixed cost, making 
piracy unprofitable. This approach to rewarding writers 
became ineffectual once technological changes made it possible 
for a pirate to use photographic methods to free-ride on the 
typesetting effort of the original publisher, bringing out an 
unauthorized edition at a lower production cost immediately 
after the authorized edition appeared. 
Over the past few decades, improved means of copying-
xerography, cassette tapes, VCR's, floppy disks, CDR's - have 
made it easier to violate copyright law by copying protected 
intellectual property (IP). Computer networks make it possible 
to disseminate pirated IP in digital form anonymously, 
impeding enforcement of copyright law. On the other hand, 
Internet search engines make it possible to search for a single 
text string in over a billion locations in a few seconds at 
negligible cost, easing the detection of some forms of copyright 
violation. Thus technological change has altered the cost both 
of violating and of enforcing the law. In some cases-
individual pirating of cassette tapes and computer software 
and off-the-air recording of television programs are obvious 
examples-technological advances have made pre-existing law 
unenforceable. We have moved, in the space of a little over a 
century, from technologies that made it possible to protect 
writings even without copyright law to technologies that make 
it impractical to protect programs even with copyright law.2 
Finally, consider the issue of whether computer programs 
are "writings," and hence legally protectable by copyright. The 
problem arose because computer programs were a new sort of 
intellectual property, one that did not clearly fit any of the 
2. More precisely, it is now impractical to use copyright law to protect 
computer programs directly against copying by individual users. It can still be 
used to prevent large-scale commercial piracy, although that may cease to be 
practical if further progress produces the sort of strong privacy that makes 
practical large-scale commercial activity online by anonymous actors. See David 
Friedman, A World of Strong Privacy: Promises and Perils of Encryption, 13 SOC. PHIL. 
& POL'y 212 (1996), available at http:j jwww.daviddfriedman.comj Academicj 
Stron~Privacy jStron~Privacy.html. In addition, the expansion of copyright 
implemented in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act may make it easier for 
owners of intellectual property to protect it by non-legal mechanisms, such as 
impeding the spread of devices for subverting technological protection. See 17 
U.S.c. §§ 1201-1204 (Supp. 2000). 
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relevant legal categories. Some courts argued that they were 
writings.3 Others argued that at least some programs, such as 
machine language programs burned into the ROM of a 
computer, were not writings, because they were not intended 
to be read by human beings.4 They were functional parts of a 
machine-in John Hersey's memorable phrase, "elaborate 
cams."s Courts taking the latter position even found a 
precedent-a case ruling that player piano rolls, the functional 
equivalent o.f .com~uter programs under an earlier technology, 
were not wrItingS. 
II. COPYRIGHT: THE LEGAL REsPONSE 
When technological change affects legal rules, the legal 
system can respond by trying to deal with the new technology 
under existing rules, by creating new rules, or by modifying 
old ones to fit the new technology. Again, copyright law 
provides examples. 
Courts that followed the precedent of White-Smith by holding 
that machine language programs were not writings applied 
existing rules by asking whether the new entity fit the 
description of the relevant legal category. The answer was 
obviously "no;" a machine language program burned into a 
computer chip is not a writing in any ordinary sense of the 
word. 
Courts that came down on the opposite side of the 
controversy, and the Congress that ultimately settled the 
matter by revising the copyright code to explicitly cover 
3. Strictly speaking, they were "literary works," the term used in the copyright 
statutes that corresponds to the Constitution's "writings." See, e.g., Apple 
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(arguing that a computer program is a literary work). 
4. Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ill. 1979) 
(finding the object phase of a computer program not a qualifying copy under 
either the Copyright Act of 1909 or common law because it is not intelligible to a 
human reader). But see Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. 
Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (holding that software embedded in a ROM was 
copyrightable). 
5. The analogy to a "cam" was made by Copyright Commissioner (and author) 
John Hersey in his dissenting opinion in THE FINAL REPoRT OF 1HE NATIONAL 
COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHrED WORKS (1979), 
available at http://home.nyu.edu/ -gmp216/ documents/ contu/ contu-finaIreport. 
txt. Judge Flaum in Data Cash Systems described a machine language program on a 
ROM as "a mechanical tool or a machine part." 480 F. Supp. at 1065. 
6. White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908). 
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software,7 can be seen as fitting new technology into old law in 
a different way. They concluded that the purposes of the 
copyright act could best be served if programs were defined as 
writings-whether or not programs were writings in any 
ordinary sense of the word.s In effect, they replaced "writings" 
in the relevant legislation and case law with "writings or 
computer programs," generating a new set of legal rules for 
software by piggybacking on an existing set of legal rules for 
writings. 
What about creating entirely new rules to fit new 
technology? One recent example is the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act of 1998.9 Part of its justification was that easy 
copying and communication, via computers and the Internet, 
had made copyright protection for intellectual property in 
digital form difficult, perhaps impossible. A promising 
alternative was technological protection, using encryption to 
build a virtual barbed wire fence around intellectual property 
whose legal protection was impractical. 10 
Virtual barbed wire might be vulnerable to digital wire 
clippers. Creating programs to bypass technological protection 
requires technical skills that few users of the protected material 
possess, but the Internet makes it possible for those few to 
produce the tools and then make them readily available to 
everyone else. Congress responded to that problem with new 
legislation designed to make the creation and distribution of 
such tools more difficult. Earlier examples of new legal rules to 
deal with new technologies for creating or copying intellectual 
7. Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3028 (1980). 
8. This argument for the copyrightability of software is defended in DAVID 
FRIEDMAN, LAW'S ORDER: AN ECONOMIC ACCOUNT 137-38 (2000). 
9. 17 U.S.c. §§ 1201-1204 (Supp. 2000). 
10. Intertrust Technologies refers to such a container as a "digibox," see Mark 
Hall, Digital Rights Firm Intertrust Set For IPO, COMPUTERWORLD (Sept. 27, 1999), at 
http:j jwww.computerworld.comjcwijstoryjO.1199.NAV47-74_Sf037107.00. 
html, whereas IBM refers to it as a "cryptolope," see IBM, IBM Cryptolope 
Technology-Executive Summary, at http:j /www-3.ibm.comjsoftwarejsecurityj 
cryptolopejabout.htmI (last visited Dec. 29, 2001). Compare Julie Cohen, Copyright 
and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 1089 (1998), available at 
http:j jwww.law.berkeley.edujjournalsjbtljjarticlesj13_3jCohenjhtmIjreader. 
htmI, with David Friedman, In Defense of Private Orderings: Comments on Julie 
Cohen's "Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, "13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1151 
(1998), available at http:j jwww.law.berkeley.edujjournalsjbtljjarticlesj13_3j 
Friedmanjhtmlj reader.htmI 
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property include the Plant Variety Protection Ac~ll the Mask 
Works Act,12 and the Audio Home Recording Act. I 
I began this essay by listing the different ways technology 
affects the law. As we have just seen, the history of copyright 
law over the past century provides examples of all of them. 
Legal problems associated with such effects are likely to 
become increasingly common as rapid technological 
development continues over the next few decades. In the next 
Part I describe three such developments and the legal problems 
they raise in some detail, and briefly sketch several more. Two 
of the three, human reproductive technology and cryonic 
suspension, have already begun to raise new legal issues. The 
third, artifidal intelligence, may eventually prove the most 
difficult to reconcile with our legal system. 
ID. LEGAL IssUES OF THE TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
A. Human Reproductive Technology 
Throughout almost all of human history, the fact that a child 
was born from the body of a particular woman was conclusive 
proof that she was the child's mother. Paternity.! on the other 
hand, was in most cases impossible to establish; it was a wise 
child that knew his father. Until very recently, these facts were 
reflected in the law by rules providing that the woman who 
bore a child was his legal mother and her husband the child's 
legal father, even if there was some evidence to suggest that he 
was not the biological father. 15 
11. Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 7 U.S.c.) (protecting sexually reproducing plants). Protection for 
asexually reproducing plants is provided by 35 U.S.c. § 161 (1994). 
12. 17U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1994). 
13. 17 U.S.c. §§ 1001-1010 (1994). The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 
permits home recording and the sale of suitable equipment and compensates 
music creators and copyright owners out of a royalty pool funded by a tax on 
digital hardware and blank recording media. See id. 
14. The exception would be the case where it was only possible for one man to 
have had sexual access to the mother, a situation that some traditional cultures 
attempted to assure, at least for high status women, with varying levels of success. 
For an entertaining eighteenth century account of the practical difficulties, see 
Matthew Prior, An English Padlock, in A COLLECTION OF ENGUSH POEMS 1660-1800, 
at 213-14 (Ronald S. Crane ed., 1932). 
15. "The parent and child relationship may be established as follows: (a) 
Between a child and the natural mother, it may be established by proof of her 
having given birth to the child .... " Cal. Fam. Code § 7610(a) (West 2001). 
HeinOnline -- 25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 76 2001-2002
76 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 25 
These facts are no longer true. Reproduction using a host 
mother implanted with an egg fertilized in vitro means that a 
child can be born from an unrelated woman. Genetic testing 
permits biological paternity to be established with a high 
degree of confidence. Legal rules at the state level have begun 
to change, by court decisions and by legislation, to reflect these 
16 
new facts. 
Further technological progress is likely to raise additional 
legal issues. Consider the parentage of a child produced by 
cloning. 17 As judged by the clone's nuclear DNA, the child's 
parents are the parents of the donor whose cell was used to 
produce the clone. As determined by the clone's mitochondrial 
DNA, the mother is the woman who donated the egg into 
which the donated cell's nucleus was implanted. Judged by the 
traditional rule for motherhood, the mother is the woman in 
whose uterus the fertilized ovum was incubated. Determined 
Furthermore, "except as provided in § 7541, the child of a wife cohabiting with her 
husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of 
the marriage." Cal. Fam. Code § 7540 (West 2001). The California rule goes back to 
at least 1919: "'The issue of a wife cohabiting with her husband, who is not 
impotent, is indisputably presumed to be legitimate.'" Brian C. v. Ginger K., 92 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 294, 298 n.2 (2000) (quoting Estate of McNamara, 181 Cal. 82, 91 
(1919) (citation omitted». The rule goes back in the common law at least to Lord 
Mansfield's Rule: "[I]t is a rule, founded in decency, morality and policy/ that [the 
father or mother] shall not be permitted to say after marriage, that ... Lhis or her] 
offspring is spurious." Goodright v. Moss, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257, 1258 (1777). 
16. "Notwithstanding § 7540, if the court finds that the conclusions of all the 
experts, as disclosed by the evidence based on blood tests performed pursuant to 
Chapter 2 (commencing with § 7550), are that the husband is not the father of the 
child, the question of paternity of the husband shall be resolved accordingly." Cal. 
Fam. Code § 7541(a) (West 2001). In addition: 
[A]lthough the [Uniform Parentage] Act recognizes both genetic 
consanguinity and giving birth as means of establishing a mother and 
child relationship, when the two means do not coincide in one woman, 
she who intended to procreate the child-that is, she who intended to 
bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own-is 
the natural mother under California law. 
Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (describing a surrogacy case in 
which the host mother, who did not provide the egg, attempted unsuccessfully to 
assert parental rights). 
In the case of In re Marriage of Moschella, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1994), the surrogate conceived by artificial insemination in order to provide a 
child for the sperm donor and his infertile wife. The court affirmed the lower 
court's judgment establishing the natural father and surrogate mother as the 
parents.Id. The court noted that "[g]enetic parenthood established by, blood tests 
trumps a presumption based on the cohabitation of a married couple. ' Id. at 1225. 
17. I am assuming replacement of the nucleus of a fertilized egg with a nucleus 
taken from a cell of an adult. A different and easier form of cloning-splitting an 
embryo at the stage where it is only a few cells to produce a set of identical 
offspring-raises fewer new legal issues. 
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by the plausible criterion of genetic relatedness, the parent is 
the cell donor, who is almost twice as closely related to the 
clone as an ordinary parent to its children, although not quite 
as closely as one of a pair of identical twins to the other. IS 
This is not the end of the story. Techniques currently exist, 
and have been applied to mice if not to humans, that produce a 
chimera (also known as a mosaic) - an individual who is, 
genetically speaking, two people, with half his cells coming 
from one fertilized ovum and half from another. Another 
technique, so far only theoretical, could be used to produce a 
child with four grandparents and no parents. Either might be 
used by a homosexual couple to produce a child genetically 
linked to both members of the couple. 19 Other future 
possibilities include transplanting sections of chromosomes 
from one cell to another or creating new genes and implanting 
them in the cell that will become a child. 
There are a variety of ways in which current law could be 
modified to take account of such developments. Probably the 
simplest would be to retain existing legal rules for children 
produced using the traditional method while defining the 
parent(s) of any child produced by non-traditional means as 
the person or persons who intended to take parental 
responsibility when the events that produced that child took 
place.20 That rule would provide at least as much certainty as 
current law does while resolving parenthood issues raised by a 
considerable range of reproductive technologies. This approach 
would also do as well as present law, perhaps even slightly 
better, at matching children with the adults most likely to care 
for them. 
18. This assumes that the cell donor is not also the egg donor. If she is, then the 
clone shares both her mitochondrial and nuclear DNA, as would her identical 
twin sister. 
19. LEE SILVER, REMAKING EDEN: How GENETIC ENGINEERING AND CLONING 
WILL TRANSFORM 1HE AMERICAN FAMILY 199-222 (1998) (describing these 
technologies and their implications). 
20. This is the approach taken by the court in Calvert, 81 P.2d at 776, and then 
followed by the court in In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 61 Cal. App. 4th 1411 (1998). 
As the situations that produce such cases become more common with the 
increasing use of the technologies, perhaps the law will begin to require that 
before a medically assisted conception may take place the responsible parties file a 
conception certificate specifying the intended parents. 
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B. Cryonic Suspension 
One striking feature of the past century has been the 
extraordinary rate of progress in medical technology. A 
hundred years ago, all that a doctor could do for most illnesses 
was predict-tell the patient whether he should ~lan to be back 
at work in a few days or start making his will. I Today, most 
serious contagious illnesses can be cured. Diseases such as 
measles and the flu, once mass killers, are now little more than 
nuisances, at least in developed countries. 
Some killers, however, such as cancer, AIDS, and heart 
disease, still remain. This raises an interesting possibility: 
You are dying of a currently incurable disease. Being 
a technological optimist, you expect that the cure will 
be discovered sometime in the next decade or two. 
Unfortunately, you can't wait that long. 
Or perhaps you can. You make arrangements to 
have your body frozen immediately after death, before 
any substantial deterioration has occurred, with 
precautions to minimize any damage done in the 
process.22 In return for a suitable payment, the firm 
that freezes you guarantees that it will store your body 
safely and arrange for your revival and cure when 
medical progress makes it possible. 
The cure for what killed you may appear in a decade 
or so, but it will probably take considerably longer to 
cure the damage done by dying and being frozen. You 
are in no hurry. If a cure never appears, all that you 
have lost is money. Comparing the downside risk with 
the upside gain, this looks like an attractive gamble, at 
least if there is any significant chance of winning. 
21. See generally LEWIS THOMAS, THE YOUNGEST SCIENCE: NOTES OF A 
MEDICINE-WATCHER (1983) (describing medical practice at the beginning of the 
twentieth century and the radical changes that followed the development of sulfa 
drugs and antibiotics). 
22. This is not a trivial problem. Ice crystals produced in the body by freezing 
can be expected to do very substantial damage, which current techniques attempt 
to minimize. For a general discussion of the subject of cryonic suspension, see 
Ralph C. Merkle, Cryonics. at http://www.merkle.com/cryo (last visited Dec. 29, 
2001). See also The Alcor Life Extension Foundation, What We Do: Cryo Transport 
and the Alcor Life Extension Foundation. at http://www.alcor.org/01b.html (last 
visited Dec. 29, 2001). 
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This is not a purely imaginary scenario. There are currently 
at least three companies in the United States23 in the business of 
freezing and storing people, and a large number of people have 
made arrangements to be frozen when and if they die.24 Of 
course, no one has been thawed and revived thus far, nor is 
anyone likely to be anytime soon. 
Cryonic suspension raises legal issues by changing an 
underlying assumption implicit in present legal rules: that 
someone is either dead or alive, and we can almost always 
discover, with a high degree of confidence, which. To see some 
of the problems that may result from this new technology, let 
us extend our story a little further: 
Under current law, you cannot be frozen until you 
are legally dead. Since you are legally dead, your wife 
is a widow and free to remarry; she does. Since you are 
dead, your heir is free to inherit your fortune; he does. 
A decade of increasingly rapid medical progress 
passes. Just ten years to the day after your suspension, 
a research team publishes some startling news. A dog 
has been suspended, kept frozen for a year, and 
revived, with no major damage. Although it is still too 
early to start reviving humans, the writing is on the 
wall. Alcor begins making a list of customers who died 
of causes now curable, and your name is on the list. 
Your wife's new husband and your heir jointly break 
into Alcor's storage facility one night, steal your body, 
and cremate it. When questioned, they explain that 
they have strong religious objections to maintaining 
the corpse of one dear to them in such an unnatural 
state. 
They are guilty of breaking and entering and of 
vandalism. They owe tort damages to Alcor for 
damage to its property. The one thing they cannot be 
23. The Alcor Life Extension Foundation, Cryonics Institute, and American 
Cryonics Society. 
24. Reports estimate that 80 to 90 bodies are in suspension and about a 
thousand individuals have signed up for future suspension. Sidney C. Schaer, 
Cryonics in a Deep Freeze: Predictions from the Past That Haven't Come True. . . Yet, 
NEWSDAY, Feb. 5, 1999, at A19. 
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guilty of is murder, because the body they burned had 
been dead for ten years. 
As this story suggests, there are serious problems with 
applying current law to a technology that makes it possible for 
many people to spend an extended time in a state of "maybe 
dead." The problem is not entirely novel-there is some 
similarity to the situation of a patient in a coma or a missing 
person mistakenly declared dead.25 But the former usually 
involves only a brief period of time and the latter a mistake. 
Cryonic suspension raises the possibility that large numbers of 
people may be known to be in a state neither dead nor alive-
with no bodily function, but a possibility of future revival. It is 
difficult to see how the law can adequately adapt to such a 
situation without a substantial innovation, perhaps the creation 
of a new legal category to apply to such people. 
The lack of a suitable category is not merely a problem for 
dealing with people who might destroy suspended bodies in 
some hypothetical future.26 It is a problem today, and one that, 
arguably, has lethal consequences. If revival is possible at all, it 
is likely to be a good deal easier for someone frozen ten 
minutes before he dies than for someone frozen ten minutes 
after. Freezing someone ten minutes before he dies is, under 
27 
current law, murder. 
C. Artificial Intelligence 
Computers do many of the same things that human beings 
25. See, e.g., Martin v. Phillips, 514 So. 2d 338, 339 (Miss. 1987) (involving a man 
who disappeared in 1969, was declared dead in 1976, reappeared in 1983, and 
tried to reclaim property that his wife had inherited from him and sold); Cann v. 
Cann, 632 A.2d 322, 324 (pa. Super. 1993) (adjudicating a similar issue in the 
context of marriage law). 
26. Even now, the problem is not entirely hypothetical. In 1987, there was an 
extended legal conflict between Alcor and a local coroner who wished to autopsy 
the head of Dora Kent, who had, according to Alcor's account, been suspended at 
a point when she was clinically but not legally dead. Alcor succeeded in 
preventing the autopsy. See Jennifer Warren, Investigation Closing in Case of Frozen 
Head, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 29, 1990, at A3. 
27. Thomas Donaldson unsuccessfully petitioned a California court in 1992 for 
the right to be suspended before legal death, in order that he could be frozen 
before, rather than after, the growth of a brain tumor seriously damaged his brain. 
Donaldson v. Lungren, 2 Cal. App. 4th 1614 (1992). See also Miles Corwin, Tumor 
Victim Loses Bid to Freeze Head Before Death. L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 15, 1990, at A28; 
Cynthia Gorney, Cryonics and Suicide: Avoiding 'the Slippery Slope,' WASH. POST, 
May I, 1990, at D6. 
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do: arithmetic, pattern recognition, logic. This raises the 
intriguing possibility that, at some time in the future, there may 
exist programmed computers that are the functional 
equivalents of humans. More than fifty years ago, Alan Turing 
proposed a simple intuitive test of personhood: have a human 
being converse, via teletype, with a computer and another 
human; if he cannot reliably tell which is which, the computer 
• 28 
IS a person. 
No machine has yet passed a Turing test, and it is unlikely 
that any will do so in the near future. Current estimates suggest 
that the processing power of the most advanced computer is 
still orders of magnitude less than that of the human brain. But 
this situation is changing. The processing power of computers 
doubles every year or two/9 the power of the human brain 
does not. Raymond Kurzweil, a computer pioneer and 
entrepreneur, estimates that in about thirty years computers 
will reach human levels of intelligence.3o 
Creating an intelligent computer is not merely a problem of 
hardware; without software, the most advanced computer is 
only an expensive paperweight. This raises an intriguing 
question: is it possible for humans to design something as 
intelligent as, or more intelligent than, ourselves? 
The short answer is that, although it may not be possible to 
design such a program, it may still be possible to create it. We 
ourselves demonstrate this fact. If we are, as most biologists 
believe, the product of Darwinian evolution, then we are 
intelligent beings created without the intervention of any being 
more intelligent than, or even as intelligent as, ourselves. 
Processes analogous to evolution have been applied to the 
28. A.M. Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, in COMPUTERS AND 
THOUGHT 11 (Edward A. Feigenbaum & Julian Feldman eds., 1963). 
29. Gordon Moore, an inventor of the integrated circuit and chairman of Intel, 
noted in 1965 that the surface area of a transistor in an integrated circuit was being 
reduced by about 50% every twelve months; he later lengthened the estimate to 
twenty-four months. Various forms of this observation have circulated under the 
name of "Moore's Law." Because doubling the number of transistors on a chip 
both doubles the amount of processing it can do and increases its speed by getting 
the transistors closer together, the implication is that the doubling time for 
computing power is less than two years. See RAy KURZWEIL, THE AGE OF 
SPIRITUAL MACHINES: WHEN COMPUTERS EXCEED HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 20-25 
(1999). 
30. Id. Much of this Part of the article is based on Kurzweil's work. Kurzweil is 
the originator of, among other things, the Kurzweil reading machine for the blind 
and the Kurzweil synthesizer. 
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. f 31 0 h . creatIOn 0 computer programs. ne approac to creating an 
intelligent computer, if we are unable to design one, is to let it 
create itself. 
A second possibility is to pirate our design from the most 
readily available source: the human brain. As scanning 
techniques improve, it should become possible to freeze and 
scan a human brain,32 layer by layer, giving us a full structural 
map at the level of the individual neuron. Combine that with 
the information currently being generated by research on brain 
function, and we have the possibility of emulating a generic 
human being in software-creating a program modeled after 
the structure of the human brain. 
A still more intriguing possibility is copying a particular 
human brain, complete with memory. Given a good enough 
form of nondestructive scanning and sufficiently powerful 
hardware, it should be possible to upload a human being, 
copying the entire structure that makes up a particular person's 
thoughts, personality, memory, and consciousness to a 
computer. 
It may be that all of this will turn out to be a fantasy. Moore's 
Law may break down before we are able to build sufficiently 
powerful computers; further research may demonstrate that 
human consciousness requires some essential element that 
cannot be duplicated by machinery, however complex. All we 
can say is that, thus far, there is no reason to think so. Hence for 
the purposes of this article I will assume that Kurzweil is 
correct, that at some point during this century there will exist 
programmed computers that are the functional equivalents of 
humans. 
Artificial intelligence (" A.L") undercuts fundamental legal 
categories. Our law has been built on the assumption that all 
real persons are human beings with the characteristics of 
human beings. One of those characteristics is a well-defined 
identity. A program, however, can be copied. Once there is one 
human-level A.L program, as many identical copies can be 
made as there is hardware available to run them. Which of 
these is the original? Which is guilty for his crimes and torts, 
31. Id. at 40-50. 
32. Such a teclmique could first be applied to the brain of someone recently 
dead, and later, when nondestructive teclmiques become available, to a living 
brain. 
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owns his property? The same problem arises for biological 
humans if they can be uploaded. After I have been copied into 
a computer, which version is really me: the one running on 
carbon or the one(s) running on silicon? 
A closely related problem arises when we consider what it 
means for an A.I. to live or die. Suppose a human saves the A.I. 
program to mass storage and then turns off the computer. Has 
he just killed the A.I.? His defense is that he can always turn 
the computer back on, reload the copy, and have the A.I. back 
with, from its viewpoint, no time having passed. Does it 
become murder if he fails to first save the program in its 
current state, but has a backup of it as of a day earlier? What if 
he saves it but never plans to reboot? If I upload myself by a 
process that destroys the original, have I ended my life or 
extended it? 
One possible response to these problems is for the law to 
close its eyes to the personhood of A.I. programs, interacting 
with them only through biological persons. In the short run this 
raises serious moral issues; it permits, for example, chattel 
slavery. In the long run, if Kurzweil's projections are correct, it 
becomes unworkable both because increasingly able A.I.' s will 
be unwilling to put up with it and because the distinction 
between biological people and A.I. people will become less and 
less sharp. Humans will be doing some of their thinking in 
silicon - and must do so if they are not to become obsolete with 
the further progress of the hardware A.I. runs on. Some 
programmed computers will in fact be uploaded humans, and 
in some cases the biological human may no longer exist. 
D. Et Multae Caetera 
I have described in some detail three areas in which new 
technology may require new law. There are many others. 
Consider, for example: 
A major constraint on wiretapping at present is its high cost, 
mostly in law enforcement labor. The progress of speech- to-
text software33 promises to reduce that cost drastically, perhaps 
by orders of magnitude. It soon will be (if it is not already) 
practical for law enforcement to tap hundreds of thousand of 
33. Commercial examples include Dragon Dictate, from Dragon Systems, Inc., 
and Naturally Speaking, from IBM Corp. 
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phones simultaneously, with a computer listening to and 
recording each call, notifying a human only if the message fits 
the criteria it has been programmed to check. A law 
enforcement agency might even argue that such taps do not 
require warrants, that until a human being listens to the 
recording the process is more analogous to a pen register than 
to a wiretap. When a human being wishes to listen to one 
recording out of a thousand, the fact that the computer 
reported that this particular recording met its criteria can be 
offered as evidence justifying a warrant. How will the courts 
and the law respond? 
Surveillance technology is becoming increasingly cheap and, 
as computer pattern recognition, including facial recognition, 
improves, increasingly effective as a law enforcement tool. 
How will the law adapt to a world in which everything that 
happens in public places (and perhaps much that happens in 
nominally private places) can be almost instantly known and 
the information rapidly searched?34 
The combination of computer networking and encryption 
makes possible a world of strong privacy where individuals 
can choose to interact anonymously, maintaining a cyberspace 
identity linked to a reputation while keeping strictly private the 
link between their cyberspace and realspace identities.35 Such a 
world raises a set of intriguing legal issues. How do you sue for 
tort damages or enforce a contract when you have no idea what 
the defendant's name is, what he looks like, or what continent 
he lives on?36 
IV. DOES NEW TECHNOLOGY 
REQUIRE NEW LAW? 
I have described technological developments, past, current, 
and prospective, that have had or will have significant 
consequences for the law. There remains the question of 
whether all of them can be dealt with under existing legal rules, 
34. See DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TEOiNOLOGY FORCE Us 
TO CHOOSE BE1WEEN PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? (1998) (discussing many of the 
issues raised by surveillance technology). 
35. See Friedman, supra note 2. 
36. See David Friedman, Contracts in Cyberspace, at http://www.davidd 
friedman.com/ Academic/ contracts_in_%20cyberspace/ contracts_in_cyberspace. 
htm (May 4, 2000). 
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properly understood, or whether at least some require legal 
innovation by judges or legislatures. 
If legal rules are defined in sufficient breadth, legal 
innovation is never necessary. Most issues raised by new 
reproductive technologies, for instance, could be resolved by a 
single, non-novel, rule: define parentage in whatever way best 
serves the interests of the child. Indeed, it is arguably possible 
to resolve all legal issues by a single very broad rule: have 
whatever legal rules maximize economic efficiency.3? 
Such principles, however, are too broad to apply with 
predictable results at a reasonable cost. Hence legal systems 
employ significantly more specific statements of the law, such 
as the traditional rules for defining parentage, and fall back on 
general principles like efficiency only when such rules prove 
insufficient for dealing with hard cases or when changed 
circumstances require the development of new rules. 
If what we mean by "new law" is "new legal rules at the 
level of generality of the rules now used to decide cases," it is 
clear that new technologies will at least sometimes require new 
laws. Legal rules that assume the identity of host mother and 
gene mother or take it for granted that paternity cannot be 
reliably determined are no longer useful in a world in which 
both assumptions are false-and the legal system has begun to 
alter itself accordingly. Legal rules that assume that a brief 
examination is sufficient to determine whether someone is alive 
or dead and that the latter status is irreversible might produce 
unfortunate results in the context of cryonic suspension. Rules 
that consider as legal persons only human beings or 
organizations of human beings and take it for granted that 
persons have the characteristics associated with human beings 
and human organizations will be wholly unsuited to a world of 
advanced artificial intelligence, when and if that world arrives. 
In these cases and many others, new technology requires new 
law. 
37. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 21-24 (discussing whether the rule, originally 
proposed by Judge Richard Posner under the label of "wealth maximization," is 
deSirable); see also id. at 297-308 (discussing whether the rule correctly describes 
the common law). 
